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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
by the state.2 5 But upon compliance with the foregoing, neither the accord-
ance of finality to the board's interpretation of the evidence 20 nor to deter-
minations of certain questions of law 27 is violative of due process.
Here, the fact that appellant in refusing to produce the subpoenaed papers.
was acting on advice of competent legal counsel, and that the crime of which
applicant was convicted involved no moral turpitude 28 is of no material con-
sequence. Apellant's contention that the Board of Regents relied on immaterial
and prejudicial evidence of the alleged subversive activities of the Refugee
Committee in determining the extent of disciplinary action taken is likewise
unavailing in that the mere fact of appellant's conviction of a crime was suf-
ficient to sustain the Board's determination.29 Therefore, if the board has
not exceeded its jurisdictional limits and if substantial evidence supports its
findings, a final determination of the constitutional validity of the empower-
ing statute precludes judicial review of the considerations upon which the
board based its decision. 3O
The instant case, in supporting the extension of discretionary powers of
administrative boards, is in accord with the vast majority of holdings. It is
submitted that the policy thus set forth is desirable as tending not only to
facilitate the accurate and expeditious fulfilment of administrative functions,
but also to prevent an even greater crowding of court dockets, the inescapable
consequence of a contrary view.
H. M. PIPPIN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW *- EQUAL PROTECTION - SEGREGATION IN RECREA-
TIONAL FACILITIES FURNISHED BY THE STATE. - Suit was brought against
the City of Baltimore and the State of Maryland by plaintiffs, adult and minor
Negroes, to enjoin segregation of the races at public swimming pools, beaches
and bathhouses. Plaintiffs claim that such segregation interferes with rights
guaranteed them by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It was stipulated at a pre-trial conference that the separate facilities
afforded the Negroes were "physically equal." The court held, that segrega-
tion of the races with respect to recreational facilities controlled by the State
(lid not deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights as long as the fa-
.ilities provided were of a substantially equal nature. Lonesome v. Maxwell,
23 F. Supp. 193 (D.Md. 1954).
Under the "separate but equal" doctrine, public facilities for Negroes and
"''hites may be separate if substantially equal.' It is not required that the
iicilities provided the different races be identical but is is sufficient if they
25. Smith v. State Board, 140 Iowa 66, 117 N.W. 1116 (1908); See Golsmith v.
nttd States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1925).
2ti. cf. Jones v. Buffalo Creek Coal Co., 245 U.S. 328 (1917); Central Land Co.
Lniidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895); U.S. v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1949).
"27. Reetz v. Michigan, supra note 11.
28. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
9. Sinclair v. United States, supra note 28; Armour Packing Co. v. United States,
t, U.S. 56 (1908).
30. Gibson v. Medical Examining Board, 141 Conn. 218, 104 A.2d 890 (1954);
,to cx rel, Kassabian v. State Board, supra note 14; Schnure v. Board of Regents, 130
Y.S. 2d 783 (N.Y. 1954); Davis v. Board of Regents, 283 App. Div. 591, 128 N.Y.S.2d
(1954); cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943);
v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Bates and Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. '106
I. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
RECENT CASES
are equivalent. 2 This doctrine has been controlling in the field of recercation.,
In recreation the courts have always demanded strict adherence to standards
of physical equality, not hesitating to strike down any segregation laws which
have only the appearance of providing equality.' Thus the doctrine has not
become a pure legal fiction. With typical judicial restraint the whole of the
doctrine has never been closely re-examined, the Supreme Court being con-
tent to point out inequalities as particular cases arise. Without specifically
re-examining the doctrine, the Court has ruled that segregation in professional
and graduate schools is a denial of equal facilities.' Aside from the more
obvious inequalities present in segregated education, such factors as restrict-
ed class of associates, less renowned faculty, and absence of school tradition in
the Negro school were cited. While comparing the relative merits of the
Negro and White law schools the Court said, ". . . the University of Texas
Law School [i.e. the one for Whites] possesses to a far greater degree those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school." c, It was made clear that while segregation was
still possible in higher education, the standards demanded were to be increas-
ingly exacting. Expressly avoiding a frontal attack on the "separate but equal"
doctrine, the Court did indicate the doctrine was capable of being reconsid-
ered in the light of contemporary knowledge respccting the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 Shortly thereafter, a case involving segregation in
recreation was remanded by the Supreme Court to be reviewed in light of
these decisions on graduate and professional schools. s It is apparent that
the Supreme Court sees some relationship between cases involving segrega-
tion in recreation and those involving segregation in higher education.
The recent case in which the Supreme Court declared segregation in pub-
lic schools violative of the equal protection clause casts a new light upon
the whole "separate but equal" doctrine. 9 Segregation in the field of public
education is now per se, unequal and thus separate school facilities can never
be made legally equal. Is the Court now ready to carry this new pronounce-
ment to its logical end and overrule the doctrine in other fields? The court
in the principal ease expresses a belief to the contrary, preferring to give the
decision a narrowly restricted application. Equality in recreational facilities
in the past has been determined only by a comparison of physical plants. 1l
2. State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Law v. Baltimore, 78 F.
Supp. 346 (D. Md. 1948).
3. E.g., Beat v. Holcombe, 347 U.S., 974 (1952) (parks); Williams v. Kansas City,
205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1953) (swimming pool); Law v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 346 (D. Md. 1948) (golf); Lopez v. Secombe, 71 F. Supp.
769 (S.D. Cal. 1944) (bathhouse).
4. Hayes v. Crutcher, 108 F. Supp. 582 (M.D. Tenn. 1952); Durkee v. Murphy, 181
Md. 259, 29 A.2d 253 (1942).
5. McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (Negro grad-
uate student required to sit at separate table); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
(Texas established separate law school for Negroes with separate buildings and faculty.
Held, not equal facilities).
6. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
7. Id. at 637.
8. Rice v. Arnold, 340 U.S. 848 (1950) (Upon remand, the Supreme Court of
Florida found that the Sweatt and McLaurira cases were not controlling in the field of
segregated recreation. United States Supreme Court refused certiorari, 342 U.S. 946).
9. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (It is interesting to note that
Justice Harlar in his classic dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 1, foresaw that
the "separate but equal" doctrine would never endure the test of time or close inspection.
10. See 35 Minn. L. Rev. 399 (1950).
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Intangible inequalities were factors never before considered. However, the
recent decision banning segregation in schools was based primarily on the
psychological damage that segregation engenders in school children, resulting
in a deprivation of equal educational opportunity." It is submitted that this
reasoning could apply to segregation in recreation, although perhaps with
diminished force. Certainly the same feeling of inferiority is present in segre-
gated play as in segregated education.
If it could be assumed that separate recreational facilities may be inherently
as well as physically equal, it may be further argued that segregation of this
kind is not a proper exercise of the state police power since it accomplishes no
reasonable governmental objective. However, the use of the police power in
requiring recreational segregation presents a different and more complex
problem than that involved in segregated education. Prejudice against the
Negroes is highest, except for direct sexual relations, in such personal activities
as bathing, dancing and swimming.1 2 As a result, it would seem a sound
governmental objective to avoid racial antipathies which otherwise would
result from these interracial contacts. Of course a natural aversion to mem-
bers of another race furnishes, in itself, no basis for use of the police power
to enforce segregation; there must be a present and pressing public necessity
for the use of it.13 It would seem that segregated recreation is a proper ex-
ercise of the police power, at least in areas of marked racial antagonisms.
Clearly, segregation is more open to attack under the equal protection clause.
The recent education cases by partial rejection of the "separate but equal"
doctrine, place the whole structure of segregation in serious constitutional
jeopardy. In line with the traditional policy of deciding constitutional ques-
tions only when necessary to resolve the issue at hand, the Supreme Court
has wisely refrained from declaring segregation, per se, unconstitutional.14 Such
a broad declaration would bring down in ruin the traditional southern so-
cial structure. The Court, aware of this non-legal reality, has merely placed
itself in such a position that it can further diminish the scope of the doctrine
upon an occasion of its own choosing, preferably as socio-political conditions
become more favorable toward the Negro. Segregation in recreation, as in
education, tends to deprive the Negro of basically the same intangible bene-
fits that all should receive under an equalitarian constitution. Racial integra-
tion of public recreational facilities is necessary if the Negro is to advance
in his continuing fight for full equality under law.
JAMES H. O'KEEFE
CORPORATIONS - POWER OF CORPORATIONS TO MAKE DONATIONS. - The
stockholders of plaintiff corporation objected to a proposed donation by the
corporation to Princeton University orr the ground that the act was ultra
vires. The corporation sought a declaratory judgment to determine the status
of its power to make such donations. The court held that a corporation was
given such power, both by statutory provisions to that effect and also by the
11. Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 9 at page 494.
12. Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 60, 61 (1944).
13. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
14. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Ohio By. Co. v. Dittney,
232 U.S. 576 (1914); Southwestern Oil and Gas Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114 (1910);
Eurton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283 (1904).
